The University of Southern Mississippi

The Aquila Digital Community
Faculty Publications
10-1-2019

The Effect of Group Polarization On Opposition to Donald Trump
Marija A. Bekafigo
Northern Arizona University, Marija.Bekafigo@nau.edu

Elena V. Stepanova
University of Southern Mississippi, elena.stepanova@usm.edu

Brian A. Eiler
Northern Arizona University

Kenji Noguchi
University of Southern Mississippi, kenji.noguchi@usm.edu

Kathleen L. Ramsey
University of Southern Mississippi, kathleen.ramsey@usm.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Bekafigo, M. A., Stepanova, E. V., Eiler, B. A., Noguchi, K., Ramsey, K. L. (2019). The Effect of Group
Polarization On Opposition to Donald Trump. Political Psychology, 40(5), 1163-1178.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/16549

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more
information, please contact Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu.

Running head: POLARIZATION AND TRUMP

1

The Effect of Group Polarization on Opposition to Donald Trump
Marija A. Bekafigo a*
Lecturer, Northern Arizona University
Elena V. Stepanova b*
Assistant Professor, The University of Southern Mississippi
Brian A. Eiler c†
Post-doctoral Fellow, Northern Arizona University
Kenji Noguchi d†
Associate Professor, The University of Southern Mississippi-Gulf Coast
Kathleen L. Ramsey e
Graduate Student, The University of Southern Mississippi

Authors’ Note
We would like to thank Kara Steidl, Jacob Rozwee, Tevin Henley, and Derron Johnson
for their assistance with data collection, transcription and coding.
Parts of the data in this article were presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the
Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, January 2017.
a

Department of Politics and International Affairs, Northern Arizona University,

Blg. 65, Rm #212, PO Box 15036, Flagstaff, AZ 86011, USA. Tel: 1-928-523-0923. Email:
Marija.Bekafigo@nau.edu
b

School of Psychology, The University of Southern Mississippi, Owings-McQuagge

Hall, 118 College Drive, #5025, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, USA. Tel: 1-601-266-4342. Email:
Elena.Stepanova@USM.edu

POLARIZATION AND TRUMP

c

2

Department of Psychological Sciences, Northern Arizona University, Blg. 60, Rm #327,

PO Box 15106, Flagstaff, AZ 86011, USA. Tel: 1-928-523-3271. Email: Brian.Eiler@nau.edu
d

School of Psychology, The University of Southern Mississippi-Gulf Coast, 730 E.

Beach Blvd., Long Beach, MS 39560, USA. Tel: 1-228-214-3284. Email:
Kenji.Noguchi@usm.edu
e

School of Psychology, The University of Southern Mississippi, Owings-McQuagge

Hall, 118 College Drive, #5025, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, USA. Email:
Kathleen.Ramsey@usm.edu
*Contributions of the first and second authors are equal, and their names are arranged in
alphabetical order. Correspondence concerning this article can be addressed to both authors.
†

Contributions of the third and fourth authors are equal, and their names are arranged in

alphabetical order.

In press, Political Psychology

POLARIZATION AND TRUMP

3

Abstract
Using focus groups, we examined support and opposition for Donald Trump prior to the 2016
presidential election. When in-group members participate in discussion, this conversation alone
typically strengthens and intensifies members’ initial attitudes (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969).
We used a pre- to post- focus group questionnaire to assess attitudes toward Trump, his
campaign, and policies. We argue that group polarization influenced people’s opinions about
Trump such that attitudes became more extreme after discussion with like-minded individuals.
We report changes for Trump non-supporters for which group polarization occurred on attitudes
toward illegal immigration, political correctness, the military, women, and veterans after the
group discussion. For each, level of support for Trump’s views decreased. To further explore
potential psychological mechanisms associated with group polarization, we employed network
science methods to examine the structure of the language associated with these issues and
identify potential drivers of attitude change. Results provide some support for a common
mechanism for group polarization, which may be driven by language dynamics specific to
individual attitudes.

Keywords: group polarization effect, focus groups, presidential election, Trump
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The Effect of Group Polarization on Opposition to Donald Trump
There is little doubt that the 2016 U.S. presidential election between Democrat Hillary
Clinton and Republican Donald Trump was bizarre. Perhaps most strikingly, while few believed
a person without any political experience could become president, Trump was elected.
Corruption, incompetence, eye-rolling, and name calling came from both party’s nominees in
what seemed like more mud-slinging and negative campaigning than ever before. Not only were
the major party candidates engulfed in constant and unprecedented campaign warfare, the parties
themselves were in disarray. Intraparty disputes over the presumptive nominees and interparty
division were at a premium. A quick Google search for “polarization in the 2016 presidential
election” revealed more than 2 million hits on the subject including: Polarization Drives
Presidential Race to the Bottom; 5 Reasons the 2016 Election Feels So Personal; The Most
Polarized Election Ever. Thus, the main goal of the current paper was to assess polarization in
attitudes towards Trump and potential mechanisms for this polarization.
Trump’s candidacy was by itself polarizing. He made repeated derogatory statements
aimed at various groups including Mexicans, Muslims, disabled veterans, and women, to name a
few. This included the infamous 2005 Access Hollywood hot microphone tape with his lewd
comments about women (Fahrenthold, 2016). He also sent combative tweets about those who
opposed him. He called Secretary Clinton “the devil,” a “nasty woman,” suggested that she
should be jailed, and made allusions to her possible assassination. Trump’s behavior on the
campaign trail also raised questions about his mental health (Caballo, 2017). While Trump’s
conduct both on and off the campaign trail was admonished by many, others gladly excused or
dismissed his conduct and even endorsed his actions citing Trump’s view of limiting political
correctness. His behavior certainly divided the electorate.
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To be sure, the nation’s voters were more polarized than ever (American National
Election Studies, 2016; Barber & McCarty, 2016; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal 2016) and they
seemed to become more so as ideological news sources pitted one candidate against the other
(Bode et. al., 2018; Mitchell, Gottfried, Kiley, & Matsa, 2014; Prior, 2007). Supporters at
Trump’s rallies chanted “Lock her up!” in response to Clinton’s use of a personal email server
for government business when she was Secretary of State. At the same time, there were
numerous protesters at Trump’s rallies whom Trump infamously asked his supporters to
physically remove and even assault. While citizens and pundits alike have denounced polarized
politics, political scientists still know little about its causes and consequences (Barber &
McCarty, 2016). It was in this political climate that we examined what would happen if
presumptive voters from one end of the political spectrum got together to talk about their
attitudes toward specific issues. Would they, too, become more polarized? Or would deliberation
attenuate polarization’s effects as some proponents of deliberative democratic theory suggest
(Chambers, 2003; Delli Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 2004)?
Theoretical Basis
There is little doubt that the U.S. Congress is polarized (Lee, 2009; Poole & Rosenthal,
2007; Sinclair, 2014; Theriault, 2008). However, research is mixed on whether voters, too, are
polarized ideologically on policy preferences (e.g., Abramowitz, 2010; Abramowitz & Saunders,
1998; Hetherington, 2001) or if they have simply sorted themselves into the two parties while
maintaining moderate policy positions (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope 2005; Levendusky, 2009).
Polarization largely occurs along party lines because party is a perceptual screen through which
voters view politics (Green, Palmquist & Schickler, 2002). Party activates both positive affect for
one’s own party and negative affect for those on the other side (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes,
2012). Contempt for opposing partisans might be further exacerbated during elections because of
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a hyperpolarized mass media coupled with heterogenous social media networks reinforcing one’s
beliefs (Bekafigo & McBride, 2013; Sunstein, 2018).
Social psychological literature suggests that when in-group members (i.e., those
belonging to the same group) participate in discussion, simply engaging in this conversation
strengthens and intensifies members’ initial attitudes (Druckman, Levendusky & McLain, 2018;
Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). Given the context of Trump’s campaign, we speculated that
group polarization could explain why so many of his supporters and opponents have gone to
such lengths to either spread or subvert his views. Informational influence explains group
polarization, such that individuals become more indoctrinated when they hear arguments that
support their position in other people's words (Kaplan & Miller, 1987). In fact, simple repetition
of the arguments that represent the dominant viewpoint increases group polarization (Brauer,
Judd, & Gliner, 1995). Biased assimilation of information is another underlying mechanism for
group polarization. When exposed to both sides of the argument, individuals tend to see evidence
supporting their initial attitude as more convincing (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Additionally,
group polarization can be explained by social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) in conjunction with
social categorization theory (Turner 1985, 1991). Specifically, Suhay (2014) argued that because
group conformity generates approval and deviance generates disapproval, adherence to in-group
political norms is essential for maintaining social status and avoiding shame. Whether the
supporting or opposing groups possess more extreme members, there should be no differences in
terms of polarization (Van Swol, 2009). In sum, both persuasive arguments and social
comparisons have been proposed as mechanisms for group polarization (for review, see
Isenberg, 1986).
These mechanisms for group polarization are perhaps more likely given the increased
affordances for social interaction and discourse (Chemero, 2003). Focus groups are one such
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opportunity. Another is exposure to social media (Bekafigo & McBride, 2013) and political
campaigns (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012) which strengthen political and ideological
polarization as like-minded individuals group together and deliberate (Sunstein, 2002).
Consequently, one goal of this study was to understand polarization surrounding Trump’s
viewpoints with potential voters in an experimental lab setting. As such, we use focus groups to
study polarization allowing us to respond to an appeal by political science to look beyond mass
surveys and predictive models to understand public opinion and elections by talking to voters
(Blakely, 2016; Gelman & Azari 2017; Masket, 2016). Additionally, we probe this effect using
modern, novel analytics (i.e., machine learning and network science) to provide some insight
into the underlying processes driving group polarization with the knowledge that mixed methods
enhance our findings.
The Current Study
In order to test for group polarization, we assembled focus groups of Trump supporters
and non-supporters during the 2016 presidential election campaign. We examined participants’
attitudes toward Trump and his policies before and after engaging in a discussion with likeminded individuals. We also gathered focus group language data to further understand the
reasons for opposition and support. While others have argued that “a simple descriptive narrative
is quite appropriate and often all that is necessary” (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007, p. 109)
for analyzing focus group data, we go further by employing content analysis to identify recurring
themes. Additionally, we employ natural language processing, a novel machine learning
technique that explores sentiment in language data (e.g., Crossley, Kyle, & McNamara, 2017), to
identify psychological processes that may influence polarization. Further, we use network
science (i.e, graph theory, Euler, 1995) to robustly identify the underlying language structure in
issues that produce polarization and language processes that drive these effects (Freeman, 1978).
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As such, this research is important for two reasons: (1) we test for group polarization and (2) we
seek to understand the underlying processes that produce polarization. While some may argue
that political science does not use focus groups or focus group tests are not generalizable, we fill
this gap by employing vigorous methodology that implicates generalized processes underlying
polarization. Moreover, the focus group data used in this study are especially important given the
discipline’s self-critique of failing to understand, much less predict, the (Electoral College)
outcome of the 2016 election (Blakely, 2016; Gelman & Azari 2017; Masket, 2016). Others, too,
have implored political scientists to go beyond polling data and listen to the public (Hibbing &
Theiss-Morse, 1995; Kendhammer, 2016; Walsh, 2012).
We expected to produce findings consistent with a group polarization effect. Specifically,
we hypothesized that participants’ initial opposition to Trump would increase from the pre- to
post-test. We did not have specific predictions on what individual issues would produce more
polarization, because there is little, if any, consensus in the literature (see conclusion for
recommendations for correcting this gap). We also expected language to reflect group
polarization. In other words, we expected the language networks to be correlated for those issues
that produced polarization, implicating a common process. We conducted exploratory analyses
on these networks to determine the types of processes (i.e., language indicators) that were most
influential in driving polarization for each issue individually and potential overlap.
Method
Participants
We carried out two Trump supporter focus groups (N = 6) and eight Trump non-supporter
focus groups (N = 37) for a total of 43 participants. The total number of focus groups for Trump
non-supporters were consistent with previous recommendations (i.e., it is recommended to
conduct three to four focus groups for each category of participant, Krueger & Casey, 2015),
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while our 2 groups of supporters fell short of this recommendation. Thus, we only report data for
the Trump non-supporters (Mage = 21.27, SDage = 5.30, 73% male) in the current paper. The
racial/ethnic composition of the Trump non-supporters was the following: 19 African Americans,
12 Whites, 1 Hispanic/Latino, 1 Asian, and 4 multicultural individuals. The political affiliation
was the following: 70.3% Democrats, 13.5% Independents, 8.1% Republicans, and 8.1% Other.
See Table 1 for additional demographic characteristics of the sample.
While our participants were all college students (convenience sample), this demographic
will be the largest voting bloc in future elections (e.g., Greenblatt, 2015). All participants were
recruited from Hattiesburg, Mississippi, during the 2016 presidential election primary season
(August—November). We recruited participants through multiple outlets. First, we posted the
study on SONA, a cloud-based research participation recruitment software that can be accessed
by participants and researchers at the University of Southern Mississippi, Department of
Psychology, via web-browser. In addition, the study was advertised on the University of
Southern Mississippi list-serv, Craigslist, Impact (a local online newspaper), and flyers placed
around campus, Hattiesburg Clinic and the city of Hattiesburg. We also reached out to several
faculty members at neighboring colleges (William Carey University and Pearl River Community
College) who advertised the study to students in their classes.
Procedure and Materials
Focus group selection, procedure, and attitudinal survey. Even though we led an
aggressive recruitment campaign, we had a very low response rate among Trump’s supporters
and ultimately decided to leave them out of our analysis. Perhaps, the issue of “silent Trump
voters” contributed to our final recruitment outcome (Nomani, 2016). Focus groups were held
several times a week in the evenings beginning in August and extending to the week before the
elections. Focus groups were independent and comprised of 3-5 individuals. Groups were
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determined based on participant self-identification of support for (or against) Trump, regardless
of party affiliation which resulted in groups of like-minded individuals. To be sure, ideology and
party ID were significantly different between Trump supporters and non-supporters. Trump’s
supporters were more conservative/less liberal (M = 5.50, SD = 1.38) than Trump’s nonsupporters (M = 2.93, SD = 1.60) on a scale from 1 (Very Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative), t(41)
= 3.63, p = .001. For party ID, Trump’s supporters were more Republican/less Democratic
leaning (M = 5.83, SD = .98) than Trump’s non-supporters (M = 2.33; SD = 1.66) on a scale of 1
(Strong Democrat) to 7 (Strong Republican), t(40) = 5.00, p < .001.
Participants in each focus group were shown several videos1 (taken from official Trump
campaign website and YouTube) and completed a demographic questionnaire. Following the
videos, participants completed a self-report questionnaire in which they indicated their level of
support for Trump’s views on specific issues (the trade war, illegal immigration, the 2nd
Amendment, political correctness, education, the military, the economy, abortion, torture,
women, Veterans, Veterans – prisoners of war, disabled individuals, and protesters at his
political rallies). Participants used a scale from 1 (Extremely opposed to) to 9 (Extremely in
favor of) with a midpoint anchor (Neutral). Themes on the attitudinal survey corresponded to a
portion of the video in which Donald Trump spoke about each topic. Videos featuring Trump
addressing each issue assessed in the attitudinal questionnaire were shown to participants to
remind them about Trump’s stance on those issues, in case some were not following the
campaign and/or familiar with specific issues. Participants engaged in a moderated 2-hour
discussion, both answering scripted questions and interacting with one another.2 The discussion

1

Please access all the videos shown to participants here:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/p7oeeq424st3uum/AACId6dinBXhsKtptJ_x2Jpna?dl=0
2
Please see a discussion guide for Focus Groups (Trump Non-Supporters) here:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/wm4mmm25yto6qs0/Discussion%20Guide%20for%20Focus%20Group%20%28Trum
p%20Non-Supporters%29.docx?dl=0
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followed a specific focus group guide that facilitated conversation on each of the points raised in
the attitudinal questionnaire. For the most part, we were interested in why participants supported
or opposed Trump. At the conclusion of the discussion, participants completed the same
attitudinal questionnaire again to assess potential attitude change (i.e., polarization effects).
Participants were debriefed and received either SONA research participation credits or a $15
Walmart gift card.
Language data acquisition and analyses. Language data were collected across focus
group sessions (audio and video recording) and were transcribed by a researcher. This procedure
facilitated coding for similar themes across groups (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007). We
analyzed the language participants used during the focus group discussion looking for additional
evidence of polarization. To identify the underlying structure in language, we used natural
language processing which relies on a machine learning algorithm to explore textual features of
language (i.e., psychological motivation, sentiment; The Sentiment Analysis and Social
Cognition Engine [SEANCE], Crossley, Kyle, & McNamara, 2017). This tool allows researchers
to identify underlying psychosocial processes instantiated represented in language and has been
demonstrated to be more robust than many other language analysis techniques (i.e., frequencybased techniques such as the linguistic inquiry and word count [LIWC], Pennebaker, Boyd,
Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015). While a full explanation of this technique is beyond the scope of the
current paper, in general, SEANCE is given a corpus of text and compares this text with
previously validated linguistic dictionaries by vectorizing language and looking for cooccurrence. In other words, a researcher identifies those indicators of interest a priori and
SEANCE produces a normalized score for each indicator in which larger scores reflect a greater
presence of the language indicator. We discuss the specifics of the language analysis in the
results and present the findings both qualitatively and quantitatively.
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Results
Pre- to Post-Focus Group Polarization
To test for group polarization, we conducted a series of paired sample t- tests on
participants’ attitudinal questionnaire ratings (there were no assumptive violations for t-tests-homogeneity of variance, normal distribution, etc). Given the small sample size for Trump
supporters (n = 6) we only report results for Trump non-supporters. For each significance test
comparing pre and post scores, we also computed associated effect sizes expressed in standard
deviation units (Cohen’s d, see Cohen, 1988) for repeated-measures designs using a correction
for dependence between means (Morris & DeShon 2002). For those who opposed Trump, group
polarization occurred for the following items: level of support for Trump’s views on (a) illegal
immigration, t(36) = 2.20, p = .04; (b) political correctness, t(36) = 2.03, p = .05; (c) the
military, t(36) = 2.11, p = .04; (d) women, t(36) = 2.61, p = .01; and (e) veterans, t(36) = 3.27, p
= .002. Across these issues, Trump non-supporters increased their level of opposition to Trump’s
views, demonstrating group polarization, in support of our primary hypothesis(see Table 2 for all
means and associated effect sizes). While some may argue that these tests are not stringent
enough (i.e., a recommendation for a p-value correction), we were unconcerned with the overall
null hypothesis (i.e., that all issues will not show polarization) and instead are more concerned
with change at the individual issue level. As such, we have kept the significance value at p < .05
in line with recommendations by Perneger (1998).
The Language of Polarization
To further clarify the nature of group polarization, we employed several analyses on the
language participants used during the focus-group discussion. Primarily we took two approaches,
one qualitative and one quantitative. First, we identified recurrent themes in the conversations
(Krueger & Casey, 2015; Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007) and present qualitative results
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and interpretation for these themes. Second, we employed natural language processing, a
machine learning technique used to quantitatively identify sentiment in language (Crossley,
Kyle, & McNamara, 2017), and used results from these analyses to construct networks (e.g.,
Eiler, Al-Kire, Doyle, & Wayment, in press; Siew, McCartney, & Vitevitch, 2019) to identify
underlying psychological processes leading to group polarization using quadratic assignment
procedures (see Robins, Lewis, & Wang, 2012 for review).
Qualitative Results
Two coders identified themes present in responses to each of the questions from the
written transcripts by collapsing similar answers into themes.3 Below we discuss the five topics
that indicated group polarization for those who opposed Trump and where possible, provide
examples of specific themes by quoting responses.4
Since group polarization occurred along particular views, we focused on the qualitative
summaries for these topics. One of the benefits of focus group research is that we can understand
polarization through participants’ narratives. This is especially important given recent criticisms
political scientists have received for focusing on polling, large n data sets (i.e., overpowered
samples), and election forecast models to the detriment of a deeper, or at least different, insight
into voter behavior (Lohr & Singer, 2016; Masket, 2016). With that in mind, we also
demonstrate how our results may reflect the broader trends exhibited in polling data.

3

The list of themes is accessible here:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/w09duxgm9vzuo51/ListofthemesPoliticalDiscussionStudy.docx?dl=0
4
Note that for illegal immigration, political correctness, and military, we asked participants what they personally
thought about each issue and what they thought about Trump’s ideas on the same. For women and veterans,
however, we only asked how participants felt about Trump’s stance on them (see Discussion Guide online, Footnote
2), mainly because we presumed that participants would not express personal negative attitudes toward these groups
in public.

POLARIZATION AND TRUMP

14

Immigration and the Mexican/Hispanic population. Group polarization occurred
among those who opposed Trump’s candidacy when asked about “illegal immigration and the
Mexican/Hispanic population.” This issue epitomized group polarization in our study. First,
participants immediately brought up Trump’s promise to build a wall along the Mexican border,
both when we asked about reasons why they oppose Trump, and about Trump’s specific policies
they opposed.
…you know illegal immigration’s a problem and we have to come up with some solution.
Now, spending billions of dollars on building a wall…it’s not fiscally responsible.
…I’d hate for like all my tax dollars to be, you know, contributed to a wall…
…His idea of the wall, in my opinion, it just reminds me of the Berlin wall.
The wall was on the top of our participants’ minds (Zaller, 1992) and their attitudes were
unequivocally negative, in line with other examples of polarization. Here, one’s initial attitude
coupled with extreme positions (certainty that the wall is not a good idea derived from the
responses from other participants—biased assimilation) was a likely source of polarization
(Boysen & Vogel, 2007). Even among those who opposed illegal immigration, a wall did not
seem to be the answer. While many participants had mixed or ambivalent views on the broader
issue of immigration, the wall (the primary focus of discussion), was a familiar, but simple,
concept around which a steadfast opinion was easily formed (Carmines & Stimson, 1980). This
was further bolstered by participants’ individual opinions in which they brought up the promise
of the wall independent of a direct connection to Trump. Our participants’ views were in line
with national polls at the time on this issue with most Americans opposing construction of a
border wall (Pew Research Center, 2016).
The military. While issues surrounding the military are complex, the prompt we used
was sufficiently vague that discussion centered on more accessible concepts such as size and
spending. Participants argued that the military was already large enough and anything bigger
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would lead to “World War III.” For similar reasons, they agreed that greater spending was
unnecessary. That is, participants’ views on the military focused on preemption rather than
retaliation associated with generalized national defense.
I say, with the military, it’s already strong, because if you look through American history,
we’re kind of like those people who aren’t supposed to be messed with…We are the number one
spender on military budget, per year, in the entire world…
Participants were also able to discern between military spending for conflict engagement
compared to veteran support monies.
We have a ton of…military planes and jets and whatnot that aren’t necessary…a lot of that
money actually, should be rearranged so it like takes care of soldiers and veterans instead of
weapons…
Political correctness. “What is political correctness?” one participant queried. Although
there were various ways of defining this concept, those who opposed Trump were quick to bring
up his lack of it. For example, one participant stated: “He [Trump] said “I’m not politically
correct and i'ma say what I wanna say anyway and y’all are gonna listen.” Some participants
also opposed Trump’s disdain for political correctness as justification for his statements.
He’s an embarrassment like for him to do stuff like that. Like to mock reporters and to
talk the way he does about women. Like publicly, that’s, that’s horrible. That’s disgusting.
Interestingly, this prompt seemed to elicit a deeper discussion than other polarizing
topics. Participants linked political correctness to free speech and democracy, but also
recognized the negative sides of political correctness that influenced Trump’s win (Greenberg,
2016). Participants discussed the potential consequences of offensive statements on the world
stage, despite one suggestion that Trump’s position reflected American sentiment. Nevertheless,
a common thread was that people should choose their words carefully so as to not offend others,
without policing. This is reflective of a recent poll in which most Americans are supportive of
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free speech even if that speech is offensive (American Enterprise Institute Political Report,
2017).
Women. We also asked participants how they felt about Trump’s statements on women
given the constant media attention on this topic. Several participants even noted that the media
was biased against Trump on this issue, citing that his opponent (i.e., a woman) contributed to a
sustained narrative on this issue. Thus, participants were likely well aware of Trump’s statements
aimed at women prior to the focus groups. Perhaps one reason why polarization occurred on this
issue was because non-supporters could easily attack him, contributing to a shared extreme
viewpoint (i.e., assimilation), as may have occurred on other issues (i.e., immigration and the
wall). No ambivalent opinions were noted.
Oh, he’s awful…Umm, being a personal feminist, that is just rude to bring up- to just
chastise a woman and assume that she’s on her cycle, like what?...He really just talks about,
“Man power, man power.” He just doesn’t put it in a woman’s perspective, how we feel, like
what’s going on. He just makes us feel like second class…
Veterans. Trump’s statements about veterans also exhibited group polarization.
Participants were in agreement that the Trump’s statement about John McCain (shown in the
videos prior to group discussion) was unacceptable and became a talking-point.
…when you’re saying that John McCain is a loser because he was captured, I’m like oh
my god… that’s literally, that’s so horrible.
While participants stated that veterans should be cared for, the rest of the discussion was
varied and indicated a quite superficial understanding of veteran’s issues or Trump’s stance on
them. However, the group’s focus on Trump’s statements about John McCain may have
produced the extremity needed for polarization via assimilation, similar to the aforementioned
issues.
Summary. Group polarization occurred for five issues related to the 2016 presidential
election campaign, though we have no evidence suggesting these issues were distinctive from the
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non-polarized issues. Participants’ views became more extreme after engaging in a discussion
with like-minded individuals. That others in the group shared their opinion exemplifies prior
research on group polarization via informational influence (e.g., when one encounters additional
novel arguments that support their original view) and assimilation (when one’s individual
attitudes get assimilated to the group’s congruent, but even more extreme position). Qualitative
analyses uncovered themes that presented opportunities for assimilation, and provided insight
into potential affordances for polarization that included the campaign videos and the focus group
setting itself.
Quantitative Results
Language structure and influence. To further address mechanisms of polarization, we
examined psychosocial processes that drove the discussion, indicated by participants’
conversations. To do so, we employed several quantitative techniques (i.e., machine learning and
network analysis) aimed at describing the language structure and determining the most important
drivers of language for issues producing group polarization effects. We also tested whether group
discussions were similar across polarized issues.
We identified 47 theoretically driven language indicators related to political science that
might influence the discussion of political issues from the presidential election campaign (see
Supplemental Online Appendix5). To do so, we had four coders select potential influential
variables from the full SEANCE indicator list of 256 and only included those for which there
was unanimous agreement. For example, we included indicators of power because politics and

5

The Supplemental Online Appendix is available at
https://www.dropbox.com/s/oqrltq0kv2o2qx0/Supplemental%20Online%20Appendix.docx?dl=0
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power have well-known associations (Lasswell, 1950). In other words, we thought our
participants conversations might include language associated with “power.”6
To describe the language structure for each of the polarized issues we aggregated all
participant language into a single corpus of text for each issue (i.e., immigration, military,
political correctness, women, and veterans), then separated comments into approximately equal
word count files (to compute correlations between indicators). These files were analyzed by
SEANCE and a normalized score for each of the 47 variables of interest was calculated. Next,
we computed pairwise, bivariate correlations (using 1000 bootstrapped samples) between all 47
variables and retained those which were significant at the p < .01 level. We took the absolute
value of these correlations as network analyses are not amenable to negative correlations (c.f.
Eiler et al., in press). Next, these correlations were input into an adjacency matrix to form
networks that quantitatively described the language structure for each discussion of the polarized
issues.
In network science terms, nodes (here, an individual language variable) are connected by
edges (here, the correlation between the two nodes) to form a network that describes the overall,
multiply causal, relationships (i.e., topology) that underlie a given system (here, the language
participants used to discuss polarized issues). As a brief illustrative aside, imagine a network of
people (nodes) who are connected by friendships (ties). Here, the network structure would
describe structure of the social network to understand the overall social system. In our study, we
also computed flow betweenness (a network measure of influence; Freeman, 1978) for each node

6

Variables were derived from several different databases including: The affective norms for English Words
(Bradley & Lang, 1999), The Geneva affect label coder (Scherer, 2005), General inquirer (Stone et al., 1966),
Lasswell (Lasswell & Namenwirth, 1969), Hu-Lui polarity (Hu & Liu, 2004), and EmoLex (Mohammad & Turney,
2010; 2013). Development, validation techniques, and word lists can be accessed via primary sources for each
database.
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to determine which variables were most influential. In our social system, this same measure
might quantify the amount of social capital each individual had in the social network. Here, the
correlations between psychological processes (derived from the language participants used)
formed a quantitative description of the discussions participants had for each issue, with an
influence metric calculated for each language indicator. We tested these ordered lists (i.e., from
high to low influence) against one another to determine whether the same language variables
were associated with polarization (i.e., ρ, Spearman’s rho) across issues. Results were nonsignificant (all ps > .05), indicating that for each issue there were unique psychological processes
driving the discussion. The 5 most influential psychological processes for each issue are
summarized in Table 3.
While these most influential processes do not indicate a common mechanism for
polarization, they do demonstrate constraints on participants’ language as a function of issue type
and provide insight into potential drivers of informational influence. In other words, these
processes represent an “educated guess” at information around which participants assimilated
their attitudes, potentially leading to more extreme views. In support of this conjecture, the
language used to discuss each of the issues was different. This is what we might expect given the
breadth of the issues that exhibited polarization. Nevertheless, there are some similarities.
Specifically, we found that multiple indicators aligned with power and authoritarianism (e.g.,
submit, power total, dominance, power authoritative participants and power ordinary
participants, see Table 3) were some of the most influential processes that drove discussions in
our focus groups. While language related to power is not surprising given the topic of
conversation, power authoritative participants, which can be interpreted as language used to
describe how power flows through followers, appeared twice in the top 5. This is notable since
authoritarian views were a key predictor of support for Trump (MacWilliams, 2016).
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Interestingly, we found evidence that Trump’s opposition disfavored those same predispositions
through their language. Moreover, one explanation for polarized politics is the increasing
tendency toward authoritarianism (Stenner and Haidt, 2018). Here, we argue that this tendency
may have played a role in producing polarization among our focus groups.
Language and polarization. Beyond describing the language structure and testing for
underlying psychosocial processes associated with polarization for each issue, we also tested
whether a general group polarization process would exist independent of issue. To test this
hypothesis, we employed a network science technique (i.e., quadratic assignment procedure;
QAP) to test for system-level associations between all language networks. This technique
examines the structural relationship between two networks by holding one network constant and
randomly permuting ties in the other. Next, a correlation between the randomly permuted
network and the constant network is calculated. This process is repeated iteratively (i.e., 10,000
samples) to create a probability density function (i.e., a sampling distribution). Finally, the
correlation between the two observed networks calculated and located within this computed
distribution to determine statistical significance (see Robins, Lewis, & Wang, 2012 for a more
complete description). For each of the polarized issues (i.e., immigration, military, political
correctness, women, and veterans) we followed this procedure to compute correlations and
significance values amongst the language networks. We hypothesized that if similar dynamics
(i.e., mechanism) gave rise to group polarization there would be positive and significant
associations amongst the networks. We found partial support for this hypothesis (see Table 4
below).
Summary. The quantitative language analyses provide initial evidence that group
polarization may be driven by a common mechanism. The positive associations between the
networks across polarized issues (i.e., QAP models) indicate these systems may arise from
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similar underlying governing principles (i.e., causal dynamics), that is, the same processes
govern language for all the networks. This is consistent with an assimilation and informational
influence account of group polarization. Additional support for this mechanism comes from the
network influence metrics. Here, we found that different issues were anchored by different
psychological processes (i.e., language indicators). Taken together, in discussions of topics that
produced group polarization, participants fixated on language particular to individual issues
(because they need different types of language to assimilate to—there is different information to
tie a topic together), but structured their conversation in similar ways.
Discussion
Political deliberation has been hailed as a necessary part of the democratic process as it
can lead to engaged citizenry, better policy, and subsequently, more citizen satisfaction (see Delli
Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 2004 for review). Yet, this deliberation can have unintended effects
including attitude polarization (Price et. al., 2003). The current study attempted to address this
potential paradox by experimentally manipulating deliberation in the time leading up to one of
the most polarizing presidential elections in US history. We allowed like-minded individuals to
discuss their attitudes toward Donald Trump and measured their attitude extremity pre- and postdiscussion. We hypothesized that this deliberation would strengthen their attitudes. We observed
this group polarization effect among those who opposed Trump on specific issues. We suggest
that attitudinal assimilation and informational influence were the primary drivers and provide
evidence that these were common underlying mechanisms by which group polarization occurred,
consistent with previous literature (Brauer, Judd, & Gliner, 1995; Druckman, Levendusky &
McLain, 2018; Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Suhay, 2014).
Although group polarization occurred for several issues, there were others for which no
effect was found. Some research has suggested that specific issues are more likely to cause group

POLARIZATION AND TRUMP

22

polarization, however there is currently no consensus (see Wojcieszak & Price, 2010 for a
summary of this literature). On one hand, it could be the case that only certain issues follow this
type of process. Alternatively, a common process may exist, but the effect size differs as a
function of some third variable. Scholars of political polarization in the electorate might focus on
identifying those issues which produce strong polarization effects to disentangle this issue of
polarization versus sorting.
Finally, linking the qualitative findings and the quantitative findings, we speculate that
attitudinal assimilation and informational influence are processes underlying group polarization
at the topological (i.e., network) level. In nearly all focus groups there is evidence of
assimilation. Additionally, there is evidence that group polarization has at least some common
underlying process. That being said, the relationships between immigration are the only ones that
include non-significant associations and are also the smallest (Table 4). Given that this issue was
found to be the most polarizing, it could also be the case that at some threshold the more
generalized polarization process (i.e., extremity/assimilation) becomes less influential and other
(as yet unknown) issues become more salient. This speculation would be in line with more
general principles of interaction dominant systems (of which networks are a canonical example)
in which processes that operate along different time scales exert differential influence (see Eiler,
Kallen, & Richardson, 2017 for review).
While the primary research question of group polarization guided our study, these data
are also are ripe to answer other lingering questions about voter behavior in this election. For
example, we could test theories about Trump’s eventual win related to populism (Inglehart &
Norris, 2016), sexism (Clinton, 2017), or authoritarianism (MacWilliams, 2016), that others have
argued were pervasive in the election. We might also explore how our results compare with exit
polls to try and tie to broader voting trends. For example, our focus groups exhibited group
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polarization for the topic of illegal immigration. Polarization on this issue was also found among
the populace. 61% of Clinton voters thought illegal immigrants working in the U.S. should be
offered legal status, while 83% of Trump voters thought they should be deported (CNN exit
polls). When asked about the wall, voters were even more polarized with 76% of Clinton voters
opposing it and 85% of Trump voters supporting it. According to exit polls, voters were also
polarized on Trump’s treatment of women (65% of Clinton voters were bothered and 87% of
Trump voters were not bothered). Unfortunately, the exit polls did not ask about abortion,
political correctness, or veterans at all or in a manner that we could connect them with the results
of our focus groups.
This work in not without limitations. All participants were enrolled in college at the time
of the study, were between ages of 18 and 30, eligible to vote and indicated their intent to vote in
the 2016 Presidential Elections. However, we do not know whether they registered to vote or
ultimately cast votes on Election Day. Regardless, this should not affect our study as we are
concerned with deliberation about politics which is separate from voting (Chambers, 2003).
While students are acceptable participants for a study of this nature (Druckman & Kam, 2011),
their partisan attachments are not as stable as a sample of older citizens (Green, Palmquist &
Schickler, 2002), nor are they likely to be as politically engaged (Abramowitz, 2010). Therefore,
we might expect them to be less polarized than the average citizen. The fact that group
polarization effect was displayed on several of the issues is even more impressive given the
demographics of our participants.
Conclusion
In general, our results show a group polarization effect, but these effects were only
present for particular issues in those who did not support Trump, such as level of support for
Trump’s views on illegal immigration, political correctness, military, women and veterans.
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Additionally, we find some support for a generalized mechanism for group polarization, as
evidenced by the language analyses. While language used to discuss each of the issues was
different—with a notable overlap in power and authoritarianism—the same process governs
language for all the issue-specific language networks. Both qualitative and quantitative language
analyses suggest assimilation and informational influence were the primary drivers of the group
polarization. We suggest that future studies should focus on determining which issues polarize
rather than making blanket statements about a polarized citizenry (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope,
2005). We also suggest that the specific mechanisms by which group polarization may occur are
tested in more stringent settings that employ more rigorous experimental control. One way for
scholars to determine whether voters are polarized or sorted is to examine individual issues and
then group them together to determine which issues are the most polarizing.
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Table 1.
Responses on demographics questionnaire in percentages for Trump non-supporters.
Variable

Response Categories

Percent

Political Ideology

Very liberal

21.6

Somewhat liberal

24.3

Slightly liberal

13.5

Neither liberal nor conservative

27.0

Slightly conservative

5.4

Somewhat conservative

5.4

Very conservative

2.7

Strong Democrat

43.2

Weak Democrat

21.6

Independent that leans Democrat

13.5

Pure Independent

2.7

Independent that leans Republican

8.1

Weak Republican

8.1

Strong Republican

0

More than once a week

5.4

Once a week

35.1

1-2 times a month

32.4

1-2 times a year

10.8

None in past year

16.2

Christianity

70.3

Judaism

2.7

Buddhism

2.7

Other

8.1

Not religious

16.2

High School

27

Vocational/Technical School

2.7

Some college

70.3

Political Party Identification

Religious Service Attendance

Religious Affiliation

Education
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Under 10,000

13.5

10,000-19,999

16.2

20,000-29,999

5.4

30,000-39,999

5.4

40,000-49,999

2.7

50,000-74,999

16.2

75,000-99,000

2.7

99,000-100,000

5.4

Over 150,000

13.5

I do not know

18.9
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Table 2.
Responses to levels of support (M, SD) for Trump’s view on the following items among Trump’s opponents. The response scale used
was 1 = Extremely opposed to 9 = Extremely in favor of. Bigger numbers indicate greater level of support.
Change column indicates the effect size (Cohen d) associated with the change. Negative ds signify that participants were more in favor
of post discussion.

The Trade War
Illegal Immigration
The 2nd Amendment
Political Correctness
Education
The Military
The Economy
Abortion
Torture
Women
Veterans
Veterans-POW
Disabled Individuals
Protestors at his political
rallies
Note. **p < .005, *p ≤ .05

Pre-discussion
M
SD
2.69
1.79
2.65*
2.03
3.16
2.5
2.6*
2.2
4.81
2.76
3.3*
2.33
3.53
2.5
1.89
1.82
2.32
2
1.95*
1.91
4.03**
2.8
2.54
2.04
1.76
1.75
1.95

1.86

Post-discussion
M
SD
2.86
1.94
2.03*
1.79
3.19
2.41
1.97*
1.88
4.3
2.54
2.65*
2.12
3.25
2.88
1.84
1.8
1.92
1.53
1.41*
1.46
3.1**
2.88
2.19
2.08
1.54
1.63
1.62

1.44

Change
d
-0.09
0.36
-0.02
0.34
0.23
0.35
0.10
0.03
0.20
0.46
0.55
0.19
0.14
0.18

POLARIZATION AND TRUMP

37

Table 3.
Top 5 processes for each polarized issue.
Influence Rank
1
2
3
4
5

Immigration
Submit
Power total
Doctrine
Religion
Military

Military
Know
If
Need
Negative outlook
Dominance

Political Correctness
Negative emotions
Hostile
Social relations
Power authoritative Ps
Wealth

Women
Politics
Negative emotions
Power total
Know
Vice

Veterans
Military
Power authoritative Ps
Wealth
Power total
Power ordinary Ps

Note. See Supplemental Online Appendix at
https://www.dropbox.com/s/oqrltq0kv2o2qx0/Supplemental%20Online%20Appendix.docx?dl=0
for detailed description of and examples for each indicator.
Submit: submission to authority or power, dependence on others, vulnerability to others, or withdrawal.
Power total: the whole domain of power.
Doctrine: organized systems of belief or knowledge, including those of applied knowledge, mystical beliefs, and arts that academics
study.
Know: awareness or unawareness, certainty or uncertainty, similarity or difference, generality or specificity, importance or
unimportance, presence or absence, as well as components of mental classes, concepts or ideas.
If: feelings of uncertainty, doubt and vagueness.
Need: the expression of need.
Negative: negative outlook.
Hostile: an attitude or concern with hostility or aggressiveness.
Power authoritative Ps: power authoritative participants, individual and collective actors in power process.
Vice: an assessment of moral disapproval or misfortune.
Power ordinary Ps: power ordinary participants, non-authoritative actors (such as followers) in the power process.
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Table 4.
QAP correlations among issues producing group polarization effects.

Immigration
Military
Political Correctness
Veterans
Women
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001

Immigration
-ns
.067*
ns
.075*

Military

Political
Correctness

Veterans

Women

-.236***
.276***
.230***

-.130***
.306***

-.111**

--

